2. The Contingency and A posteriority Constraint: A formulation of the thesis must make physicalism come out contingent and a posteriori. First, physicalism is a contingent truth, if it is a truth. This means that physicalism could have been false, i.e. there are counterfactual worlds in which physicalism is false, for example, counterfactual worlds in which there are miracle -performing angels.[9] Moreover, if physicalism is true, our knowledge of its truth is a posteriori. This is to say that there are (...) ways the world could turn out to be such that physicalism is false. For example, if there are miracle -performing angels, then physicalism is false. So there are worlds considered as actual in which physicalism is false.[10] For short, call this ‘the a posteriority constraint’.[11]. (shrink)

In Part 1 of this book, the first full-length treatment of its topic, J. L. Schellenberg argues that when we notice how.

J. L. Ackrill; VIII*—Aristotle's Definitions of Psuche, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 73, Issue 1, 1 June 1973, Pages 119–134, https://doi.org.

This is a superb introduction to the application of Chomskian linguistics in cognitive psychology and the study of linguistic performance. It is exceptionally clear, accurate, concise, and well-organized; so very well done, in fact, that it can be read by someone who knows nothing about recent linguistics or about its use in psychological experimentation, and yet can delight and profit readers who know a great deal about both subjects. Greene begins by giving a clear and discrete account of the linguistic (...) theory of Syntactic Structures and the later "standard theory" of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. This historical approach is helpful because the first psycholinguistic applications derived from the first theory: e.g., attempts were made by George Miller, et alia to confirm that the time taken to grasp a sentence depended on the number of optional transformations involved in its generation—a "kernel sentence" with no optional transformations would take less time than its passive or negative transform, and these in turn less than, say, its passive and negative transform. Since there are neither kernel sentences nor the relevant optional transformations in Aspects standard theory, later experimentation has been concerned with confirming the psychological reality of deep, as against surface, structure: e.g., Bever’s attempt to show that, given that a subject who hears an anomalous click while listening to a sentence will psychologically displace the click to a position between major sentence constituents, there is some tendency for the displacement to operate in terms of what the grammar indicates are deep structure divisions rather than surface ones. (shrink)

This book argues that a descriptive, systematic, non-intuitive semantics cannot be provided for a natural language: that while a non-intuitive, formal explication can be provided for the competent speaker’s intuitions about grammaticality, this has not been, and likely cannot be, provided for such a speaker’s intuitions of synonymy, analyticity, and significance. Tartaglia concludes that Quine has actually established, not that we do not have an intuitive, informal notion of the analytic-synthetic distinction, but rather that we have failed, and likely will (...) fail, at providing "a practical, nonintuitive procedure for deciding, irrespective of extra linguistic content, whether a given statement is analytic or synthetic." "[Since] the language of knowledge consists of a system or systems in which no single statement can be said to be true or false in isolation from other statements in its system, then the lexicographer’s problem is insoluble". Tartaglia criticizes the 1964 Katz-Fodor paper, "The Structure of a Semantic Theory" by the undiminishing flea method: the bachelor finally dies is ambiguous both by theory and intuition; but the old bachelor finally dies requires the addition of a semantic marker,, to bring theory in line with intuition ; and the congenitally blind bachelor finally dies will make another semantic marker necessary and so on. But the trick can be worked with grammaticality too. Tartaglia suggests that grammaticality is well on its way to a reasonably adequate explication, while synonymy, etc., is not. (shrink)

Three long papers are collected here which constitute Chomsky’s major theoretical work on syntax and semantics subsequent to the "standard theory" of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Since 1965, transformational-generative linguists have suggested various changes in "standard theory," centering on the relationship between the syntactic and semantic components in natural language grammars. In these papers Chomsky explains several specific problems that require the extension of standard theory and he criticizes the proposals and arguments of the generative semanticists, attempting to (...) show that many of the specific features of language that are claimed to support the generativist position are as well or better explained by extended standard theory, and emphasizing that most of the generativist’s proposals turn out to be mere "notational variants," evidentially indistinguishable from extended standard theory. Aside from appealing to particular data favoring his "lexicalist" defense of syntactic deep structure, Chomsky makes a Popperean appeal that his position is preferable because it is more constraining and more falsifiable. (shrink)

Abstract:Implementing creative and sustainable urban planning initiates is rather challenging. This article argues that universities can become more relevant to underserved communities in their hinterlands by conducting town-gown citizen-science programs. Central to the article is a review of the most pertinent literature on public engagement, citizen-science, and other community based participatory methods utilized in the resolution of very complex health, social, environmental, and consumption problems. The research’s analytical mechanism is centered on the triad of Placeless, Place and Non-Place genius loci (...) of socio-spatial town-gown interventions. The curricular and pedagogical innovations identified entail the strengthening of citizen-science and design thinking in both high school and university education. (shrink)

This paper addresses two related questions. First, what is involved in giving a distinctively realist and naturalist construal of an area of discourse, that is, in so much as stating a distinctively realist and naturalist position about, for example, content or value? I defend a condition that guarantees the realism and naturalism of any position satisfying it, at least in the case of positions on content, but perhaps in other cases as well. Second, what sorts of considerations render a distinctively (...) realist and naturalist position more plausible than its irrealist and non-naturalist rivals? The answer here focuses again on theories of content and is wholly negative. I argue that the standard array of arguments offered in support of realist and naturalist theories in fact provide equal support for a host of irrealist and non-naturalist ones. Taken together, these considerations reveal an important gap in the recent philosophical literature on content. The challenge to proponents of putatively realist and naturalist theories is to insure that those theories so much as state distinctively realist and naturalist positions and then to identify arguments that support what is distinctively realist and naturalist about them. (shrink)

This chapter suggests that descriptive epidemiological studies like the Global Burden of Disease Study can usefully be divided into four tasks: describing individuals’ health states over time, assessing their health states under a range of counterfactual scenarios, summarizing the information collected, and then packaging it for presentation. The authors show that each of these tasks raises important and challenging ethical questions. They comment on some of the philosophical issues involved in measuring health states, attributing causes to health outcomes, choosing the (...) counterfactual against which to assess causes, aggregating and summarizing complex information across multiple domains, discounting, age-weighting, handling fetal deaths, measuring health inequalities, representing uncertainty, and assessing personal responsibility for health outcomes. (shrink)

Recent accounts on the global workspace theory suggest that consciousness involves transient formations of functional connections in thalamo-cortico-cortical networks. The level of connectivity in these networks is argued to determine the state of consciousness. Emotions are suggested to play a role in shaping consciousness, but their involvement in the global workspace theory remains elusive. In the present study, the role of emotion in the neural workspace theory of consciousness was scrutinized by investigating, whether unconscious and conscious display of emotional compared (...) to neutral facial expressions would differentially modulate EEG coherence. EEG coherence was measured by means of computing an average EEG coherence value between the frontal, parietal, and midline scalp sites. Objective awareness checks evidenced that conscious identification of the masked facial expressions was precluded. Analyses revealed reductions in EEG coherence in the lower frequency range for the masked as compared to unmasked neutral facial expressions. Crucially, a decline in EEG coherence was not observed for the emotional facial expressions. In other words, the level of EEG coherence did apparently vary as a function of awareness, but not when emotion was involved. The current finding suggests that EEG coherence is modulated by unconscious emotional processes, which extends common views on the global workspace architecture of consciousness. (shrink)

Esta obra es un viaje por el camino recorrido por la filosofía trascendente, que pone de relieve la pervivencia de conceptos como "sujeto", "crítica" o "reflexión". El núcleo fundamental del libro está en el estudio de la situación terminal a la que conduce el planteamiento fenomenológico husserliano y en el hallazgo de nuevos ámbitos de trascendentalidad. Puede advertirse cómo la vieja filosofía de sujeto-conciencia llega a transformarse y girar, para dar cabida a nuevos temas: la corporeidad, la intersubjetividad, el lenguaje, (...) que tradicionalmente habían sido silenciados o infravalorados. (shrink)

According to Christian physicalism (CP), a human person does not have an immaterial soul, but is identical to or constituted by a physical object. This chapter focuses on several reasons to think CP does not adequately account for the stewardship obligations. If CP is properly confined to the resources actually available to a physicalist anthropology it seems unable to account for the capacities of stewards, including a first‐person perspective, knowledge of the natural world, reasoning, and the ability to act. To (...) the extent that CP does seem able to account for these capacities, it relies heavily on a nonexplanatory notion of emergence and apparently nonphysical notions of teleology and life. But on physicalism, concepts emerge as the result of causal interactions with the brain, and this means that those concepts are limited to what can be explained by the individual learning history of a human organism or natural selection operating on the human species. (shrink)

Quizá la "dialéctica de la Ilustración" no sea sino el equívoco de una Ilustración que no es consciente de sus dificultades. Quizá si esas dificultades hubieran sido mejor conocidas, no se hubiera culpabilizado a una "razón" cuyo peor defecto fue mostrarse ufana acerca de sus ilusorias seguridades. Este libro quiere alegar en favor de una tesis: una ilustración consciente de su propia improbabilidad no debiera sentirse decepcionada por la escasez de sus prestaciones. Acaso alrededor de los textos kantianos podamos todavía (...) hallar el ámbito en el que, más allá de la limitada lectura de Foucault, sea perceptible el sentido clásico de la Ilustración, fortalecida por su anclaje en la historia de la razón occidental, siempre con la voluntad de distanciarse de Platón y de hacer pie en las playas epicúreas y estoicas. (shrink)